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HOW TO DETECT ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
by ROBERT S. KAY 
Much has been said about the auditor's responsibility— 
often pronounced "guarantee"—for the adequacy of 
financial statement disclosures. This is particularly true con-
cerning those transactions that are regarded as lining the 
wallets of insiders, to the possible detriment of share-
holders and creditors. But is there also a role for the finan-
cial executive with respect to these related party transac-
tions now in the news? 
The seriousness of charges recently levied at not only 
independent accountants but also corporate directors and 
officers, including financial officers, should prompt us to 
evaluate what the financial executive can do—indeed, 
should do. 
The responsibility for adequate disclosure of related 
party transactions is not a new issue. Financial executives of 
publicly held companies know that information required 
by the SEC must be contained in SEC filings, whether or not 
the information is also included in the financial state-
ments. It is at least debatable, therefore, whether a com-
pany's financial statements are "complete" or "adequate" 
when they do not disclose related party transactions, even if 
that disclosure is elsewhere within the filing. 
How much information should be contained in the finan-
cial statements, including the footnotes? If none, what ob-
ligation is there to disclose these transactions with related 
parties in documents filed with regulatory authorities? Is 
there no guide to follow? 
Financial executives, you're in luck! But you may not 
have recognized it, because the source of your good 
fortune is contained in a recent Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) issued by the AICPA's Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee (AudSEC), It has been said that SASs 
are written for auditors only. Right? Wrong! Indeed, I 
would recommend highly that financial executives be 
familiar with SASs, since they guide the independent CPA 
who performs the audit of his company. In this instance, it is 
SAS 6, "Related Party Transactions,"that suggests the audit-
ing standards and disclosure specifications that the finan-
cial executive should be alert to. 
On the basis of what may not be an auditor's responsi-
bility could well be a responsibility of the financial execu-
tive, J will discuss here SAS 6 (effective for financial state-
ments for periods ending on or after December 26,1975), 
and a Touche Ross Technical Letter, issued in 1974, on 
"Management Involvement in Material Transactions." 
The SAS describes steps designed to (1) identify related 
party transactions and (2) audit the substance of such trans-
actions, including financial statement disclosures. Natural-
ly, for the auditor to be satisfied in these areas, so must be 
the financial executive who is responsible for preparing the 
financial statements. 
Overview of SAS 6 
The SAS does not apply to intercompany transactions that 
are eliminated when consolidated financial statements are 
presented. This is obvious. On the other hand, when 
separate financial statements of components are pre-
sented, intercomponent transactions generally are not 
eliminated, and the provisions of SAS 6 are certainly then 
applicable. 
Who is a related party? The SAS definition includes the 
reporting entity, its affiliates, principal owners, manage-
ment and members of their immediate families, and APB 
Opinion 18 investors and investees. It also covers any other 
party with whom the reporting entity may deal, when that 
party's influence extends to the ability to prevent the 
reporting entity from fully pursuing its own interests. In-
cluded, too, are situations in which entities dealing with 
each other are both susceptible to influence by a third 
party, such as when a series of companies are subject to the 
owner's discretion concerning which company shall 
handle a particular transaction. 
Note that even though some transactions are not given 
accounting recognition, they are nonetheless related party 
transactions. For example, a parent company may provide 
services to a subsidiary without charge. 
Excluded from related party transactions are situations in 
which a company is economically dependent on one or 
more parties with which it does a significant amount of 
business—such as a supplier, franchiser, distributor, 
general agent, borrower, or lender. While these parties are 
not related parties—there is not a significant management 
or ownership influence—disclosure of economic depen-
dency may be necessary in the financial statements. 
The cardinal rule in SAS 6 is that "established accounting 
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principles ordinarily do not require transactions with re-
lated parties to be accounted for on a basis different from 
that which would be appropriate if the parties were not re-
lated." For now, primary emphasis is therefore placed on 
the adequacy of disclosure, as well as on the substance of a 
transaction rather than its form being given accounting 
recognition. 
Much of the SAS deals with three broad audit areas: 
—Determining the existence of related parties. 
—Identifying transactions with related parties. 
—Examining identified related party transactions. 
A financial executive who knows what his auditor is now 
required to achieve is obviously better prepared to pro-
vide him with the necessary material. But beyond that, he 
should take an "auditor" type interest in information 
generated by his accounting systems and summarized into 
financial statements. How else can he really satisfy himself 
concerning the veracity of the information presented? 
Here are highlights he should be familiar with from the 
audit procedures section of SAS 6: 
• Documentation for related party transactions—or at 
least those exceeding a certain materiality threshold— 
should be agreed upon between the company and the 
auditor. 
The auditor should be aware that there could also be 
undisclosed material related party transactions. In assess-
ing a company's propensity for such undisclosed trans-
actions, the CPA must understand management's respon-
sibilities, and the extent of controls over management 
activities. 
• Primary emphasis is placed on auditing material trans-
actions with parties the auditor knows are related parties. 
After the auditor has identified material transactions 
with known related parties, he is also asked to identify 
material transactions that may be indicative of the exis-
tence of previously undetermined relationships. 
The auditor is also asked to examine related party 
transactions to establish their purpose, nature, and extent, 
and their impact on the financial statement. There is a 
particularly interesting footnote: "Unti l the auditor under-
stands the business sense of material transactions, he can-
not complete his examination." 
» Some additional procedures not common today are 
going to be implemented more and more. Auditors will 
more regularly: 
—Confirm the transaction amount and terms with the other 
parties. 
—Inspect evidence held by the other parties. 
—Confirm or discuss with intermediaries, such as banks, 
guarantors, agents or attorneys. 
^Obta in information regarding the financial capability of 
the other parties. 
—Look to any unusual information source they can think of 
when they have some reason to suspect a material trans-
action to be lacking substance (obviously, an open-
ended procedure). 
The "additional procedures" just described apply not 
only to related party transactions. Literally, they apply to 
any material transactions. This is a major fault, in the view of 
Touche Ross, with the SAS, for it keeps switching between 
related party transactions and material transactions. It must 
be read very carefully so that the auditor will not walk by his 
obligation with respect to material transactions, even if 
there is no evidence of a related party being involved. 
Likewise, the financial executive has to realize that, even if 
he believes there are no related party transactions, the 
auditor still has to do a great deal of work, and be provided 
with considerable information, with respect to material 
transactions. 
How Does SAS 6 Impact Financial Executives? 
What are the responsibilities of a financial executive in rela-
tion to what is basically a directive to auditors? Consider the 
following: 
The financial executive has a responsibility to main-
tain an adequate system of internal control in order to (1) 
identify those related party transactions which will be 
acceptable within the normal operating activities of the 
company; (2) prevent (or quickly identify) those that are 
not so acceptable; and (3) produce adequate documenta-
tion. Because related party transactions often occur at the 
highest management levels, however, it is difficult to devise 
a system of internal controls which will ring bells when a 
related party transaction is occurring. Since the top eche-
lon of management is ultimately accountable to the owners 
of the business through the directors, it would seem advis-
able to have a strong representation of outside directors on 
the board. This would help to assure the board's objec-
tivity when dealing with the acceptability of related party 
transactions involving top management. 
In the area of standards for related party transactions, 
the last word has certainly not been written. Whi le the 
financial executive must remain alert to all possible ques-
tionable practices by his company, he is hampered by lack 
of standards in the same way the auditor is. 
• The financial executive simply cannot record trans-
actions without satisfying himself that authentic backup 
material exists. Any auditor doing his job properly will ask 
for it. 
• The financial executive is responsible for adequate 
8 
financial statement disclosure, including SEC-required dis-
closures where appropriate. He is also responsible if the 
substance of a transaction would require recording in some 
way other than the form of the transaction. 
Disclosure of Related Party Transactions 
SAS 6 deals extensively with disclosure and, tangentially, 
with accounting considerations. Disclosure of a material re-
lated party transaction must include: 
—The nature of the relationship. 
—A description of the transactions for the period being re-
ported, including amounts, and "such other infor-
mation as is deemed necessary for an understanding of 
the effects on the financial statements." Note the open-
ended nature of this subjective requirement. 
—The dollar volume of transactions and the effect of any 
change in the method of establishing terms (such as in a 
parent/subsidiary relationship, where the customary 
transfer price may have been significantly changed to suit 
the convenience—perhaps tax planning objectives—of 
the parties). 
—Amounts due to or from related parties, and (if not other-
wise apparent) the terms and manner of settlement. 
A very controversial paragraph deals with equivalence 
disclosures in financial statements. SAS 6indicates: "Except 
for routine transactions, it will generally not be possible to 
determine whether a particular transaction would have 
taken place if the parties had not been related, or assuming 
it would have taken place, what the terms and manner of 
settlement would have been." This premise strongly sug-
gests that companies should not report in their financial 
statements that a related party transaction was consum-
mated on an arm's-length basis, because that is impossible 
by definition. Nonetheless, a fair number of equivalence 
disclosures do exist in practice, and the SAS requires that if 
the auditor is unable to reach a conclusion concerning the 
accuracy of the equivalence statement, he should amend 
his report accordingly. 
The trouble with that conclusion is that it is only a partial 
conclusion. The way it is written leaves out: 
—Any indication of whether the company has made a com-
parison of the related party transaction with a similar 
arm's-length transaction, and what the results of such 
comparison were. Some companies do set transfer 
pricing, for example, on the basis of market prices. If this 
is done, the auditor should know it. Most particularly, if 
the company has made such a comparison and does not 
report a significant disparity between market prices and 
prices actually used, and if the auditor does not raise any 
objection to that situation, it is valid to question whether 
the financial statements present all the necessary infor-
mation or whether they are misleading. 
—Any explicit requirement that the auditor pursue an 
intuitive feeling about a material transaction not being 
equivalent to a similar arm's-length transaction. 
Whi le louche Ross agrees there can be no related party 
transaction on an arm's-length basis by definition, we also 
believe that disclosure should be made if there is a sub-
stantial disparity between the terms of a related party trans-
action and a similar arm's-length transaction. In some 
respects, accounting recognition might be given to such 
significant differences, because they would raise a ques-
tion concerning the substance of the transaction. Many 
auditors believe that this is the import of SAS 6. 
Every informed financial executive knows that little in the 
way of accounting prescription exists in the official litera-
ture with respect to related party transactions. Even SAS 6 
suggests its desperation by saying that, "until such time as 
applicable accounting principles are established by appro-
priate authoritative bodies . . .," primary emphasis has to 
be placed on the adequacy of disclosure and on reporting 
the substance of related party transactions. 
It is interesting to note that the recent FASB Exposure 
Draft on Accounting for Leases has this to say about leases 
between related parties: the leases should be reckoned the 
same as leases with unrelated parties but "modified as 
necessary in the circumstances in recognition of account-
ing principles generally applying to transactions between 
related parties." 
W e have asked the FASB to either delete or expand on 
this statement, because to our knowledge there aren't any 
such accounting principles, unless SAS 6 is looked upon as 
providing them. In any event, an exposure draft on leases is 
a rather remote place to bury accounting principles for re-
lated party disclosure. 
The Touche Ross Approach 
W e are all aware of recent notorious management frauds. 
In many instances, undisclosed or misassessed related party 
transactions were underneath these frauds. SAS 6 is a subtle 
response to this situation. A year earlier, Touche Ross pre-
pared a booklet with a purpose similar to that of SAS 6; it 
was called "Management Involvement in Material Trans-
actions," 
Of course, the terminology "related party transactions" 
is somewhat euphemistic—just like "management in-
volvement in material transactions." Neither of these titles 
includes the vernacular term "management fraud," but 
both documents clearly embrace it. However, in our book-
let, we cover it directly, while the SAS simply covers it by in-
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ference. That is, the word "fraud" is not used in the entire 
SAS. This, we think, is a disservice to all involved in the pre-
sentation of financial statements. Since they are not privy to 
all AudSEC meeting discussions, the obliqueness of the SAS 
may impair its understanding. 
The Touche Ross approach is more structured than is that 
of SAS 6. Its focal point, for audit purposes, is the identifi-
cation of material transactions. These are defined gener-
ally in terms of percentages relative to the financial state-
ments. This is not ironclad, because obviously qualitative 
factors have to be taken into account. W e think that a good 
way for the financial executive to deal with SAS 6 is to iden-
tify and schedule all the material transactions included in a 
set of financial statements. By focusing on material trans-
actions, he is likely to cover the transactions encompassed 
by SAS 6. 
There are other differences between the Touche Ross 
booklet and SAS 6 to keep in mind: 
—The Touche Ross booklet offers an extensive discussion 
of conducive economic factors and business structures. 
The SAS offers only a brief discussion of economic fac-
tors and simply mentions in passing the questions of busi-
ness structure, 
—The Touche Ross document includes SEC definitions of 
management that fall within its definition of related 
parties, and it presents excerpts from professional litera-
ture on the topic of related parties. 
—As indicated earlier, Touche Ross requires some inquiry 
into arm's-length equivalence. It is at least debatable 
whether the SAS calls for this. 
—In the area of documentation, Touche Ross offers spe-
cific requirements about needed work papers, memo-
randa, and audit programs. The SAS specifies only that 
the auditor must obtain sufficient competent evidential 
matter (other than representations of management) to 
properly evaluate related party transactions and their 
effects on the financial statements. 
—Finally, Touche Ross has included some quantitative 
materiality criteria in its document. 
In large measure, Touche Ross covers a number of 
auditing and accounting topics, and one wouldn't really ex-
pect to see all this covered in a single SAS, because of in-
herent jurisdictional limitations on its content. 
What difficulties has Touche Ross encountered as a result 
of its one-year head start on SAS 6? 
Here are a few highlights: 
• It would be braggadocio to say that we have un-
covered numerous management frauds as a result of 
applying these procedures. Oh yes, we have found a few, 
but who is to say they wouldn't have been found anyway? 
After all, when one realizes that the fundamental propo-
sition of SAS 6 is understanding the client's business in 
order to see if the material transactions make sense, the 
substance of the SAS becomes interwoven throughout the 
entire audit, and it is never really determinable whether the 
resulting audit conclusions can be directly identified with 
one or another procedure. 
W e did, however, find quite a few related party trans-
actions that we had not consciously addressed in the past. 
No doubt this was due to a more consistent definition of a 
related party. 
* Touche Ross requires confirmation of the terms of all 
material transactions, whereas SAS 6 indicates this is one of 
those "additional procedures." As might be expected, 
some clients felt they were justified in not wanting these 
confirmations sent. In all fairness, the financial executives 
understood our audit needs, and wanted to be coopera-
tive. The difficulties were mostly encountered at the chief 
operating officer level. Our conclusion is that the advan-
tages of sending the confirmation outweigh the risk of a low 
reliability response. 
Perhaps most significant, Touche Ross found that 
applying auditing for related party transactions to the 
smaller, closely held companies is the most difficult. As a 
generalization, closely held businesses may not be too con-
cerned about the distinctions between company trans-
actions and owner transactions. The president or chairman 
of the smaller closely held client, not understanding the 
contemporary clamor about management fraud and re-
lated parties, has often argued vociferously against the 
auditor's need to apply SAS 6 to that particular audit en-
gagement, plus the additional audit costs it would entail. 
Conclusion 
All auditors are now applying SAS 6 on related party trans-
actions to 1975 calendar year audits. No doubt they are 
having start-up difficulties, because the SAS is not a cook-
book. As the auditor is having difficulties, so will financial 
executives—in assessing their own responsibilities, and in 
complying sincerely with the new procedures required by 
auditors. 
The lack of accounting specification has never been a suf-
ficient defense in the courts when misleading financial 
statements have been asserted to exist. Although account-
ing specification is improving, it will be necessary for the 
financial executive and the auditor to work closely in 
identifying related party transactions. Their cooperation is 
also required in deciding what concise, yet complete, dis-
closure should be given in response to such situations in a 
particular company's financial statements. O 
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